Jubin m goodarzi biography of albert

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Personal data may be processed e. IP addressesfor example for personalized ads and content or ad and content measurement. Find it at other libraries via WorldCat Limited preview. Bibliography Includes bibliographical references p. Contents The emergence of the Syrian-Iranian axis, The achievements and limits of Syrian-Iranian power, Intra-alliance tensions and the consolidation of the Syrian-Iranian axis, Into the twenty-first century: the Syrian-Iranian nexus endures.

Publisher's summary The alliance between Syria and Iran has proved to be an enduring feature on the political landscape of the Middle East. Moreover, since its inception after the Iranian Revolution, it has had a significant impact in terms of moulding events and bringing about major changes in this troubled region. The study demonstrates that, contrary to prevailing views, the alliance between the two states has been essentially defensive in nature.

It emerged in response to a series of events and developments, most notably, the Iraqi invasion of Iran inthe Israeli invasion of Lebanon in and US adventurism in the Middle East. The book traces the critical stages in the evolution and consolidation of the alliance in the s, and offers explanations for its longevity into the 21st century. Husieva dirs.

She has worked at several European and North American universities in the positions of researcher, assistant and visiting professor, including at Harvard University, the European University Institute in Florence, at the Universities of Frankfurt, Jena and Giessen and York University in Toronto. She has published widely on energy security, climate change and security, and European security policy.

In Spring she was invited as a research fellow at Tongji University, Shanghai. Crises and no end? Multilateralidad: Una mascara para la militarizacion de la seguridad? Perspectives, Cases and Methods, Vol. Providing Security in a Changing World? Buonanno, P. Galletta, and M. The role of civic capital on vaccination. Forthcoming on Health Economics Open access link.

Plevani, and M. Earthquake hazard and civic capital. Forthcoming on European Journal of Political Economy Puca, M. ISBN: Health Policy. Buonanno P. Gervais Rufyikiri has diversified experience both in the academic and political fields. During his position as Vice President of Burundi and previously as President of the Senate of Burundihe contributed to building post-conflict institutions, initiating and implementing reforms for good governance, political stability and economic growth.

Rufyikiri has been involved in teaching and research in diverse fields and universities. Sincehe carries out research and teaches courses at the Geneva Center for Security Policy on the topics of leadership, security, governance and development in fragile states. Rufyikiri was educated in Burundi and Belgium. He holds a doctoral degree in biological, agronomic and environmental engineering from UCL Irakoze, H.

Prodjinoto, S. Nijimbere, J. Bizimana, J. Bigirimana, G. Rufyikiri, S. Nijimbere, G. Rufyikiri and S. With Egypt out of the equation in the Arab—Israeli conflict, Syria initially pinned its hopes on the unity scheme with neighbouring Iraq. He also expressed confidence that their bilateral relations would continue to grow and flourish at the official and popular levels.

While Tehran encouraged the Iraqi Shiites to defy the government in Baghdad, Iraq also conducted a wide range of activities to support centrifugal forces on the periphery of Iran, including Kurdish and Arab movements that demanded autonomy or independence from the Iranian state. By late spring, a major insurrection had broken out in Iranian Kurdistan, while in the oil province of Khuzestan Arabestan local resistance movements had begun to oppose the regime by attacking oil installations and government facilities.

In an editorial on 14 June in the Iraqi daily Al-Thawrah, the author severely criticized the theocratic regime in Tehran and belittled the past achievements of Persian civilization, by arguing that: Persia was liberated from the tyranny of emperors only twice in thousands of years. The first time was by the Muslim Arabs who bravely fought Anoushiravan, defeated his army and demolished his empire — which was built on tyranny and corruption — and spread Islam, the religion of right and justice, in Persia.

The second time the Iranians were only able to rid themselves of their tyrannical emperor, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, through Islam — for whose advancement and spread among nations, including the Persian nation, primary credit should go to the Arabs. Then, statements by some prominent clerics with no official status in the regime further tarnished Arab—Iranian relations.

The most notable instance occurred at a press conference in Qom on 15 June, when Ayatollah Sadeq Rouhani declared that Bahrain was an integral part of Iran. His statement, which Baghdad and Cairo sharply rebuked, provoked a strong reaction throughout the Arab world. The battle lines of the Persian Gulf War had been drawn. With respect to the Arab—Israeli conflict, Tehran turned over the former Israeli embassy to the PLO as an expression of its solidarity with the Palestinian cause.

Iran not only became an enemy of Israel but also identified with the position of the Steadfastness Front. As they saw it, nurturing an Arab—Iranian friendship would strengthen the Arab camp. The Iranian authorities made systematic efforts to stress the commonality of interest, history and culture between Persians and Arabs within the framework of the Islamic ummah community.

The increase of Arabic language instruction and Arab studies in the curricula of 28 schools and universities reflected this trend. On the other hand, they knew quite well that if the Arabs took a hostile stance towards Iran, there was a distinct possibility that 31 Tehran would renew its links with Tel Aviv and Washington. Historically, these two contending jubin m goodarzi biographies of albert had presented Iran policy makers with a major dilemma.

They did not see the revolution as an opportunity to end the Arab—Iranian rift, but rather as an event that could spark domestic unrest in neighbouring states and threaten regional stability. As it turned out, Iranian— Iraqi relations, for instance, were marked by tension and distrust from almost the very beginning. It is important to note that the failure of the Syrian—Iraqi unity talks corresponded in time with the emergence of the Islamic Republic in Iran.

In fact, the Iranian revolution sharpened already existing antagonisms and introduced new stumbling blocks on the path to reconciliation. On almost every issue to do with Iran, be it the Shah, Khomeini, Shiite fundamentalism or Arab—Iranian relations, Damascus and Baghdad had conflicting views. While Iraqi—Iranian relations steadily improved under the Shah between andSyrian— Iranian ones deteriorated over the same time period.

Assad welcomed the Shiite awakening in the Middle East after the Iranian revolution, while Baghdad feared that Iran would incite the restive Shiite population in southern Iraq to rebel against it. The Syrian—Iranian entente and the road to war —80 A month after the Syrian—Iraqi negotiations collapsed amid accusations of Syrian involvement in the alleged coup attempt, Syrian foreign minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam was sent to Iran as part of a major diplomatic initiative to expand relations between the two states.

Khaddam held talks with Iranian foreign minister Ebrahim Yazdi and Prime Minister Bazargan on increasing political and economic cooperation between the two countries. When Syria began to make serious overtures to Iran, the latter could respond positively because of the rapid deterioration of Arab— Iranian relations in the Gulf.

Tehran thus gradually began to put more emphasis on its friendship with Damascus. The tensions in the Gulf were to a large extent an outgrowth of the escalating crisis between Iran and Bahrain. Deterioration of Iranian—Gulf Arab ties and the Syrian mediation effort Although the appointment of an Iranian ambassador to Manama partly allayed Bahraini concerns, the detention of a prominent Bahraini Shiite cleric, Muhammad Ali al-Akari, on his return from a visit to Iran sparked demonstrations and unrest.

The escalating cycle of tension continued with Iran intentionally or inadvertently conducting naval manoeuvres in the Gulf, which Bahrain interpreted as Iranian muscle-flexing. Ayatollah Rouhani subsequently added more fuel to the fire by warning the Emir of Bahrain that unless he stopped oppressing his people, Iran would encourage the Bahrainis to 36 demand unification with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Apart from sharp words from Bahrain and Kuwait, as a sign of things to come, the Iraqis and Egyptians were only too happy to denounce Iranian behaviour and express readiness to protect Arab interests in the Gulf. Egyptian Vice-President Mubarak stated that Egypt would, if asked, provide military support to Bahrain or any other Arab state that was the victim of foreign aggression.

Iran, in turn, lashed out accusing Baghdad and Cairo of blowing the matter out of proportion to justify trying to fill the vacuum left by the Shah as the new policemen in the Persian Gulf. Coupled with historical Arab—Persian and Sunni—Shiite prejudices, the stage was gradually being set for a full-scale war. The Kuwaiti and Iraqi news media at the time accused Iran of using religion as a front to establish a new Persian empire and to create schisms among the Sunni and Shiite Arabs in the area.

In his meeting with Assad, he extended an invitation to the Syrian leader to visit Iran in the near future. This was followed up by the visit of Iranian deputy prime minister Dr Sadeq Tabatabai in early October to discuss the rift between Iran and its Arab neighbours. However, Iran would not sit idly by in the event of a conflict between the Arabs and Israel.

He went on to attack Egyptian President Sadat as a traitor to the Arab cause who was attempting to fan the fires of hatred in the Gulf in order to re-enter the Arab fold in a circumspect manner. Tabatabai also held discussions with the grand mufti of Syria who praised the Iranian revolution, stressed the need for Islamic unity and declared that there was no difference between Sunnis and Shiites.

There, they had a joint meeting with the emir, prime minister, foreign minister and heir apparent who was also the defence minister. Despite the jubin m goodarzi biography of albert Syrian—Iranian initiative to calm tensions, and subsequent Syrian claims that their mediations had bridged the differences between the Gulf Arabs and Iran, relations between the two sides continued to be uneasy.

Iraqi—Iranian relations then sank to new depths in autumn A cycle of mutual recriminations, continuous border clashes, incessant interference in the affairs of the other and calls to overthrow the other regime led to the closure of Iranian consulates in Basra and Karbala, and Iraqi consulates in Khorramshahr and Karbala. However, a major confrontation with the USA after Islamic militants seized the US embassy in Tehran on 4 Novembertemporarily eclipsed the growing tensions with Iraq.

The Syrians even suggested that the Arab League take up the issue at its summit in Tunis in late November. In the meantime, a flurry of diplomatic activity ensued. Again, only Syria and Libya were out front demonstrating their solidarity with Iran. Then, a few days later, an official Syrian government statement supported the Iranian cause and expressed concern over the US naval build-up in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea in response to the hostage crisis.

Two days before the Iranian delegation arrived in Damascus, Brigadier-General Mohammed al-Khouli chief of Syrian air force intelligence, director of special operations in the Middle East and a close aide of Hafez Assad arrived in the Iranian capital. While in Tehran, he delivered a message from Khaddam and held extensive talks with Sadeq Ghotbzadeh.

According to Western intelligence reports, during his visit the two sides secretly agreed to conduct joint covert operations against Iraq to destabilize Saddam Hussein. Apparently, the main outcome of the meetings was closer collaboration between the Syrian and Iranian intelligence services to assist the activities of the Shiite opposition in southern Iraq.

In late November, when Saudi Shiites in the oil-rich Hasa province tried to commemorate the holy day of Ashura, which the authorities had banned, clashes with security forces resulted in a number of deaths. Saudi authorities quickly rushed in 20, troops to restore order. Although Shiites were traditionally a repressed minority in the Saudi kingdom, the victims of discrimination and poor treatment and therefore with legitimate grievance against Riyadh, the evidence suggests that, as the Saudis have charged, Iranian ayatollahs like Khalkhali and Rouhani were trying to encourage Shiite opposition to Riyadh.

His comments prompted a swift response from Tehran that accused Baghdad of serving the goals of Western imperialism by refusing to participate in the Steadfastness Front against Israel and the unity scheme with Syria. Iran also moved in November to restore full diplomatic relations with another of its staunch Arab allies, Libya.

Ties between the two had been broken nine months earlier by Iranian suspicions that Qadhafi was responsible for the disappearance of the 41 prominent Lebanese Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Musa Sadr. It is worth mentioning that during a three-week period in the month of December, unidentified gunmen probably Iraqi-backed twice attacked Syrian diplomatic representations in Tehran.

In the latter incident, at least one Iranian Revolutionary Guard assigned to the premises was shot. As early as NovemberSaudi Arabia and Iraq had reportedly begun secret negotiations about collective security arrangements in the Gulf. During these talks, Riyadh apparently agreed to the stationing of Iraqi forces in Bahrain and Oman to prevent any unrest instigated by Iran and to serve as a 42 springboard for military action against the latter.

Before the Iranian revolution, Iraq had been seen as the main revisionist power in the area bent on upsetting the existing status quo. Instead, they also described it as un-Islamic and presented the rivalry between Iran and Iraq as an extension of the age-old conflict between Persians and Arabs. They concentrated on those that would counter the Iraqi challenge and allow Iran to join in the Arab—Muslim battle against Israel in the Levant.

The Iraqi leadership had by then become extremely sensitive to the attitude of other Arab countries towards the Iranian revolutionaries, interpreting any Arab sympathy for the clerical regime as a betrayal of greater Arab and Iraqi interests. Syria, on the other hand, continued to cultivate strong ties with Tehran, despite the increasing disillusionment with its policies among the majority of its Arab neighbours.

Senior officials like the information minister Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad articulated the Syrian position and stressed in an interview that: We appreciate the role of the Iranian revolution and we are establishing the closest possible relations with it in various fields. For example, in a speech about the incident, Saddam evoked the year-old battle of Qadisiyah between the Persian Sassanid and 46 Arab armies.

Khomeini for his part, asked for Syrian cooperation with Iran in its struggle against imperialist and anti-Islamic forces like the USA and Iraq. Escalating tensions between Iran and Iraq were revealed in different ways throughout the region. Following the debacle in the Iranian desert, the Syrian regime received Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh on the first leg of an Arab tour to win support for Iran.

He briefed them on the details of the US rescue attempt and other regional developments. Another topic high on the agenda, according to diplomatic sources, was the growing tension between Iran and Iraq and the need for further Syrian assistance. At another press conference on 1 May, Khaddam criticized the US onslaught on Iran, emphasizing that any effort directed against the Iranians would be considered to be against the Arabs also.

He accused Washington of trying to impose its 50 will on the Arab world. The weapons included mm anti-tank guns, mortars, artillery pieces, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft missiles and ammunition. Damascus had apparently agreed to provide military help during a secret visit by a personal representative of Iranian President Bani-Sadr in April.

The emissary had submitted to Assad a detailed list of weapons, ammunition, spare parts and medical equipment that Iran urgently needed 51 to counter a possible Iraqi attack. In addition to the arms airlift, Syrian military personnel were sent to Iran to train and familiarize the 52 Iranian troops with the military equipment. Its relations with Saudi Arabia and Morocco deteriorated badly in mid when the Saudi and Moroccan monarchs expressed regret that the Steadfastness and Confrontation states had recognized the RASD at their meeting in Tripoli.

Syrian motives at the time were defensive and offensive. He saw a Syrian—Iranian axis in the region as strengthening his hand, thus giving him the leverage he needed to deal with Baghdad, Riyadh and Tel Aviv from a position of power. Another bone of contention between the Syrians and Saudis was the inclusion of South Yemen as a confrontation state at the Tripoli conference.

When the Syrian ambassador and his staff were expelled from Baghdad on 18 August and Damascus retaliated in kind three days later, Syrian—Iraqi relations reached a nadir. In early September, Damascus responded positively to the Libyan call by proposing a union between Syria and Libya. Assad eventually undertook an official state visit to Libya where the two leaders held extensive talks, which culminated in a declaration of unity under the terms of which the two states would take simultaneous steps towards forming a single political entity ruled by a single executive body and revolutionary command.

The Libyan leader wanted finally to legitimize his dubious claim that his country was a confrontation state. Ever since Israel and Egypt had signed the Camp David accords, he had consistently argued that nothing stood between Israel and Libya, and Syrian—Libyan unity seemed to be an effective way of lending credibility to his position.

After Camp David, Qadhafi had, after all, promised to foot a billion dollar bill for Soviet-made arms for the Steadfastness Front. Moreover, it was hoped that the union with Libya would translate into a reliable source of oil for Syria, which no longer considered it prudent to rely on Iraq and Saudi Arabia given the poor state of relations between those two countries.

Both parties also believed that a union between them would strengthen their bargaining position with Moscow, thereby enabling them to persuade the Soviets to upgrade their military 54 assistance to the new state. Baghdad, on the other hand, ridiculed the Syrian—Libyan unity attempt, stating that it would inevitably fail, for neither party was sincere in its unionist intentions.

The Iraqi media also denounced Damascus and Tehran as enemies of Arabism and criticized them for supporting the Amal militia in Lebanon. Iraq, for its part, was also at this time engaged in intense diplomatic manoeuvring and discussions with prospective allies as it prepared to go to war with Iran. Subsequently, in early August, Saddam flew to Taif where he spoke to the Saudi monarch and informed 57 him of his decision to invade Iran.

The following month, the Iraqi leader received the Bahraini prime minister, Shaykh Khalifah bin Salman al-Khalifah, and later on the Qatari foreign minister. Finally, on 17 September, Saddam Hussein convened an extraordinary session of the Iraqi national assembly, where he announced the abrogation of the Algiers accord with Iran, thus setting the stage for the invasion of Iran five days later.

After prolonged talks and consultations, the Syrian leader refused to give Iran public support or to conduct military exercises in the east, for fear of the political repercussions it would have on the regime both domestically and regionally. However, Assad agreed to resume arms shipments to Iran as soon as possible. Within a few days of the war starting, the Syrians began to airlift weapons, medical supplies and teams of ordnance experts and physicians to Iran.

Only Qadhafi and Arafat sent messages to both Baghdad and Tehran expressing regret and pleading for an end to the war, since it only served US and Israeli interests. Although Syria remained silent, Assad spoke on the telephone with the Saudi and Jordanian monarchs on 25 September in the hope of finding a way to stop the hostilities as soon as possible.

He subsequently sent his minister of state for foreign affairs Faruq alShara to Taif to confer jubin m goodarzi biography of albert King Khaled. However, all indications seem to suggest that the mission was in vain. Despite Arab support for Iraq, Baghdad made three major mistakes when it decided to launch a full-scale war. It not only miscalculated its own military capability and the resilience of its revolutionary foe, but also failed to secure its western flank by mending fences with Damascus before setting out to deal with Iran.

The Syrian regime feared that if Iraq decisively defeated Iran, it would come under a direct threat from Baghdad. Furthermore, a victorious and confident Iraq would be in a favourable position to assist the Syrian Muslim Brethren openly and challenge Syrian interests in the region. While the war produced no new alignments, it crystallized the already emerging rival camps, thereby polarizing the Arab world even more.

The most important axes in the early phase of the conflict were the Syrian—Iranian—Libyan and Saudi—Iraqi—Jordanian ones. The Mafraq air base in eastern Jordan was in effect handed over to the Iraqis. Jordan also put its port facilities at Aqaba at their disposal, and mobilized a fleet of trucks and transport vehicles to take the cargo to Iraq.

Furthermore, in early October, a 40, strong Jordanian force was reportedly moved to the Jordanian—Iraqi border, ready to 60 intervene in the Gulf War if the need arose. Damascus claimed that fighting Iran would divide the Arab ranks and needlessly divert their attention at a time when they should be concentrating their energies on defeating the true enemy, Israel.

It clearly stated that the war was neither in the interest of Iran nor Iraq and the Arab nation. Meanwhile, Iraq continued its intense propaganda against Syria, accusing it of betraying the pan-Arab cause by sending troops and weapons to Iran. Despite Iraqi claims that Syrian and Libyan soldiers were captured in the fighting, no convincing evidence was ever 64 produced.

The negotiations included arrangements to have Soviet arms delivered to Iran. The Kremlin also approved the shipment of Soviet-made arms from Syria, Libya and other countries to Iran. Iranian air force Boeing s, s, s, and Lockheed Cs flew to Damascus and Tripoli carrying arms and ammunition back to Iran. Furthermore, some Cs brought Iranian 68 casualties to Damascus for treatment in Syrian hospitals.

The Syrians played a critical role in maintaining the flow of arms from various Arab states to the Islamic Republic. Soviet-made equipment from Libya was shipped by sea to Syrian ports, and then transhipped by 69 land via Turkey. Algeria also commenced arms transfers to Iran in Mayafter having decided to aid the Iranian war effort. These weapons were first sent by ship to the Syrian port of Tartus, where 70 the cargo was unloaded and subsequently flown to Iran.

Their ambassador to Tehran, Ibrahim Yunis, assiduously relayed useful intelligence to Iranian 71 officials, and Moscow too used him as a conduit of information. To improve the coordination of the joint Syrian—Iranian effort to stem the Iraqi onslaught, General Ali Aslan, the Syrian deputy chief of staff and head of operations, travelled to Iran to consult his Iranian counterparts.

He discussed the military situation with the joint chief of staff, General Valiollah Fallahi, and with General Javad Fakuri, the defence minister and air force commander. The war quickly brought the rifts in the Arab world into sharper focus and deepened existing cleavages. The Iraqi foreign ministry declared Syrian and Libyan embassy staff persona non grata and gave them 48 hours to leave.

A statement released by the foreign ministry asserted 74 that the rulers of the two countries were devoid of any Arabism. Interestingly, Syria and Libya both denied giving Iran military assistance, even after the Iraqi announcement. The Saudis warned Qadhafi to stay out of their internal affairs and instead of supporting Iran to remain neutral or side with Iraq in the war.

Jubin m goodarzi biography of albert

The intense inter-Arab squabbling in October clearly demonstrated that the Arab world was more divided than ever. The eruption of the Gulf War alone was not cause enough for two mutually hostile camps to emerge, but with the plethora of other politically divisive issues confronting the Arabs, the conflict caused even the most ardent pan-Arabists to drop any illusion of existing Arab unity.

Baghdad eventually had to compromise its pan-Arab stand by dispatching a military delegation to Cairo to buy spare parts and ammunition for its rapidly depleting Soviet-made arsenal. Worsening Iranian—Gulf Arab relations following the Islamic revolution and the outbreak of the first Gulf War finally gave the Egyptians a back door through which to improve their relations with Iraq, but more importantly through which to re-enter the Arab political arena.

While the Syrian armed forces had a Soviet-manufactured arsenal, the Iranian equipment the clerical regime inherited from the Shah consisted mainly of US arms. Third, deploying troops along the Syrian—Iraqi border to ease Iraqi military pressure on revolutionary Iran was bound to evoke a harsh response from many Arab capitals. Thus, Iran was forced to compromise its political stand by approaching Israel for spare parts and equipment to maintain its Western-equipped armed forces.

However, while Tel Aviv may have made temporary inroads by re-establishing contacts in Tehran, Egyptian collaboration in the Iraqi war effort was to have a far greater and more lasting impact on inter-Arab politics. The Syrian—Jordanian confrontation and the Amman summit By the autumn ofdifferences on a whole range of critical political issues had brought Syrian—Jordanian relations to an all-time low.

Two weeks before the Amman summit, Damascus made known its reluctance to attend the meeting when Foreign Minister Khaddam urged the secretary-general of the Arab League, Chedli Klibi, to postpone the conference. On his arrival, he tried to persuade Assad and Khaddam to drop their request to postpone the summit meeting. However, the Saudi foreign minister failed to sway the Syrian leaders who subsequently exacerbated the situation by accusing Jordan of mistreating Syrian citizens at border crossings between the two states.

An incident in which a member of the Syrian Muslim Brethren was assassinated in Amman and the two killers apprehended and executed by the 80 Jordanian authorities further heightened the tensions. However, the discussions degenerated into a row when the issue of postponing the summit was put forth. The meeting apparently came to an abrupt end amid confusion and sharp exchanges between Syrian and Iraqi representatives.

The Syrians announced that they wanted comprehensive talks on all inter-Islamic disputes, such as the Gulf War and their fallout with Iraq, before the summit convened. If their demands were not met, they would boycott the conference. Subsequently, the PLO stated its intention to follow suit if other members of the Steadfastness Front also refused to participate.

Damascus asked for a smaller-scale summit to be held in an Arab capital other than Amman, a request that came from the serious differences of opinion among the Arab foreign ministers over the exact agenda of the conference. In the meantime, as tensions mounted between Syria and Jordan, Iran made a serious effort to lobby members of the Steadfastness Front to back the Syrian position.

In conjunction with the Syrian effort, the speaker of parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, travelled to Algeria and Libya where he held discussions with government officials. On 23 November, two days before the summit, he flew to Damascus for talks with Syrian leaders. King Hussein had hoped to benefit from backing Iraq, which he perceived as the emerging dominant power in the Middle East.